Kremlink: Is Russia Trying to Build Its Own SpaceX? | UACRISIS.ORG

On March 23, 2026, Russia launched 16 satellites of the Rassvet system from the Plesetsk Space Center. The "Rassvet" low-Earth orbit broadband satellite system project, implemented by Bureau 1440, is a key element in the Kremlin's strategy to achieve "digital sovereignty." At the same time, Russian official media are interpreting the event as the launch of Russia's own version of Starlink.

On the other hand, its current political and media significance far exceeds the actual level of deployment, as key questions regarding scalability, the cost of the ground segment, and the network's actual bandwidth remain unresolved. As of the present, the launch of the first batch of satellites does not yet signify the emergence of a fully-fledged and sustainable broadband communication system. At this stage, it is more a demonstration of intent and technological ambitions than the creation of a ready-made infrastructure capable of providing Russia with an autonomous communication channel in both the military and civilian sectors.

The Kremlin's Ambitions

The "Rassvet" project is Russia's attempt to build a low-Earth orbit constellation that could partially reduce its dependence on Western digital platforms and communication channels. The system operates on low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites at an altitude of 500-800 km, which reduces signal latency to 38-42 ms. This is considered the necessary standard for modern network protocols and real-time systems. Key technological innovations include the integration of 5G NTN (Non-Terrestrial Networks) architecture, which allows satellites to act as base stations in orbit, and the use of intersatellite laser links (ISL) to transmit terabytes of data without the involvement of ground-based gateway stations.

A proprietary satellite system could potentially allow Russia to deploy a secure military messaging network and geospatial data exchange systems that would be isolated from the global internet. As of March 2026, the project has moved from the experimental stage (the "Rassvet-1" and "Rassvet-2" missions) to the serial deployment of the target constellation.

According to Russian authorities, the "Rassvet" system is a response to the critical dependence on Western technology that became apparent during the invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, the Russian authorities plan to transform "Rassvet" into a secure communications network that could eventually be used for military command and control, data exchange with unmanned systems, and long-distance infrastructure support.

Meanwhile, "Bureau 1440" has already unveiled prototypes of terminals for rail transport capable of providing stable connectivity at speeds of up to 400 km/h. Memorandums have also been signed with Aeroflot regarding the installation of terminals on aircraft by 2028.

Russia's "space internet": yet another costly myth?

Over the next two years (2026-2027), the key indicator of the project's success will be Russia's ability to launch the promised 250+ satellites into orbit and begin commercial operations. If "Bureau 1440" can establish mass production of low-cost subscriber terminals, Russia will gain a tool for influence both domestically and in various regions of the world, effectively creating an alternative "space internet" (alongside China's "Qianfang" satellite system) free from American control. Otherwise, the project risks remaining an expensive state initiative with a limited user base within law enforcement agencies.

The criticism, which came not only from Ukrainian or Western sources but also from within the Russian military community itself, deserves special attention. Following issues with access to Telegram and the general vulnerability of battlefield communications in 2026, some military correspondents and pro-war commentators directly asked what exactly the Russian army intends to use to replace the usual coordination channels on the front lines. What is significant in this criticism is not only the emotional tone but also the substance of the accusation: Russian authors effectively acknowledged that while the state declares a commitment to digital sovereignty, it lacks a fast, widespread, and accessible solution for combat units.

Another striking motive behind this criticism is the gap between the public display of a "space breakthrough" and the reality on the front lines. Even commentators loyal to the regime have pointed out that grandiose statements about a future orbital network do not solve the current problem of tactical communications. In other words, the skepticism of part of the Z-community is rooted in doubts about the Russian state's ability to quickly transform an expensive image-building project into a functional tool for the military.

The ground segment remains the project's weakest link. For satellite internet to become widespread, the price of the terminal must be affordable for the average citizen or small business. The stated cost of 50,000 rubles for individuals seems overly optimistic.

This leads to a more cautious assessment of the project's international prospects. If "Rassvet" cannot provide a relatively inexpensive subscriber terminal, stable bandwidth, and reasonable scaling timelines, its potential as a foreign policy tool will be limited. In that case, the system will remain not so much a global alternative to Western networks as an expensive state-run communications network for select users -- primarily the security forces.

Ultimately, "Rassvet" should be viewed not as a fully-fledged alternative to Starlink, but as an attempt to create a counterpart under the pressure of war, technological constraints, and the nation's dependence on external communication channels. The launch of production satellites itself shows that this project is not merely declarative and does indeed have political priority and resource support. At the same time, as of today, this is more about the beginning of a long, expensive, and technically vulnerable process, the outcome of which is not yet guaranteed, and the practical value of the system for military and civilian tasks remains an open question.