Rivers of discord, lifelines at risk

THE suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India in 2025 has reignited one of South Asia's most perilous flashpoints: water. For Pakistan, a lower riparian state whose agriculture, food security and livelihoods depend on the Indus Basin, the threat of disruption is nothing short of existential. The crisis raises three urgent questions: Can India truly stop Pakistan's water? Will this dispute escalate into war? And what options does Pakistan have to safeguard its lifeline?

India's announcement to suspend the IWT was framed as retaliation after violence in Kashmir. While the rhetoric was incendiary -- Prime Minister Modi declared, "Blood and water cannot flow at the same time" -- the practical capacity of India to halt Pakistan's water is constrained. Geography and infrastructure limit India's ability to divert or store significant volumes of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers. Experts note that while India can regulate flows through dams, it cannot completely block them without risking floods in its own territory. Yet even symbolic disruptions -- particularly in winter when flows are lean -- could devastate Pakistan's wheat harvest and destabilize rural livelihoods. The threat is not unprecedented. India's own water activist Anna Hazare once warned his government that "water is more precious than gold," urging restraint in exploiting rivers for political ends. His reminder resonates today: weaponizing rivers risks not only neighbours' survival but one's own stability.

Pakistan's National Security Committee has already warned that "any diversion of Pakistan's water is to be treated as an act of war." This stark framing underscores the gravity of the issue. Water is not merely a resource; it is the foundation of Pakistan's civilization, economy and identity. Agriculture contributes nearly a quarter of Pakistan's GDP and employs over 40 percent of its workforce. A deliberate disruption of river flows could cripple the economy and provoke mass unrest. In such a scenario, military escalation becomes a real possibility, especially given the absence of trust between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. As former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari thundered, "The Indus is ours and will remain ours, either our water will flow through it or their blood." Yet war over water would be catastrophic. Both nations are nuclear powers and any conflict risks spiralling beyond control. The IWT was designed precisely to insulate water-sharing from politics. Its breakdown drags the issue back into the volatile domain of national security, where miscalculation could prove fatal.

Pakistan's vulnerability lies not only in India's threats but in its own inadequate water management. Current storage capacity -- spread across Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma dams -- amounts to barely four weeks of reserves. International standards recommend at least 120 days. This shortfall leaves Pakistan exposed to seasonal fluctuations and potential upstream manipulation. Projects like Mohmand and Diamer-Bhasha dams, slated for completion in the late 2020s, will add capacity, but until then Pakistan remains dangerously dependent on uninterrupted flows.

Pakistan's response must be multi-pronged. Diplomatically, it must continue pressing its case internationally. The World Bank, as guarantor of the IWT, has already clarified that unilateral suspension is legally untenable. Mobilizing global opinion by framing India's actions as violations of international law and threats to regional stability is essential. Legally, Pakistan has invoked the Permanent Court of Arbitration in disputes over Indian dams. While India contests jurisdiction, pursuing arbitration keeps the issue within legal frameworks and prevents it from sliding into military confrontation.

Domestically, expanding storage capacity is critical. Accelerating construction of Mohmand and Diamer-Bhasha dams, alongside smaller reservoirs, would provide Pakistan with a buffer against seasonal shortages and upstream disruptions. Regionally, Pakistan could leverage its position in broader South Asian water disputes. By aligning with Bangladesh and Nepal, which also face challenges from India's upstream projects, Islamabad could build a coalition advocating for equitable water-sharing norms.

Finally, while war is undesirable, Pakistan's military establishment views water as a red line. Maintaining credible deterrence signals to India that any attempt to weaponize water will provoke a response. Yet this option must remain a last resort, given the risks of escalation. Water conflicts are not unique to South Asia. From the Nile Basin to the Tigris-Euphrates, upstream states have sought to assert control, often provoking downstream insecurity. The Indus Basin dispute thus fits into a global pattern where water scarcity intersects with geopolitics. Yet unlike other regions, the India-Pakistan rivalry is compounded by nuclear weapons and historical enmity, making the stakes far higher.

India's suspension of the IWT may be more symbolic than immediately harmful, but symbolism matters. It signals a willingness to weaponize water, eroding one of the few pillars of stability in bilateral relations. For Pakistan, the threat is existential, demanding urgent action. As environmental historian Dan Haines observed, "Water is a real pressure point for Pakistan. Water is very politically sensitive." The path forward lies in diplomacy, legal recourse and infrastructure development. War would be disastrous, yet ignoring the threat is equally perilous.

Pakistan must prepare for a future where India's hydro-infrastructure could alter flows more significantly. In the words of Saadat Hasan Manto, written decades ago, "...who can close a river; it's a river, not a drain." That literary reminder underscores both the resilience of rivers and the folly of attempting to weaponize them. Yet in today's climate of mistrust, even rivers can become instruments of discord. The challenge for Pakistan is to ensure that its lifelines remain flowing -- through strategy, diplomacy and resilience -- lest the waters of the Indus become the waters of war.

-- The writer, Retired Group Captain of PAF, is author of several books on China.